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EVALUATION OF TECHNOLOGY
AND
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (TA)
José Félix Tobar Arbulu
“If the man of science of our own days could
find the time and the courage to think over honestly
and critically his situation and the tasks before him
and if he would act accordingly, the possibilities for a
sensible and satisfactory solution of the present dan-
gerous international situation would be considerably
improved.”
Albert Einstein (Ideas and Opinions).
1. INTRODUCTION
Can we afford to stand aloof from technology while living immersed
in an artificial environment that is more and more the child of big industry
based on scientific and technological research? Although we are increasin-
gly aware that technology is instrumental for both welfare and warfare, do
not most of us —including many technologists— ignore what technology is?
The fact is that not even technologists are always acquainted with the natu-
re of their own products, the methods by which they obtain them, or the
historical root and social setting of their own work. It is true that some peo-
ple are specialists in the history of technology or in the sociology of techno-
logy realizing that it is difficult to isolate the economic, social, and political
consequences of technology (1). But technology is not only a subject for
scholarly specialization, and this simply because the future of mankind
depends, to an increasing extend, on the results, methods, valuation, and
uses of technology.
Nowadays metatechnology cannot contribute to the control of tec/h-
nology for the benefit of humankind, because research is now a power and
an industry. Moreover, it is mostly a military powerful industry. But meta-
(1) Actually, economic and social factors cannot be dissociated from political and cultu-
ral factors for we consider society as a system of systems (Braudel 1982: Ch. 5;
Tobar, 1983).
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technology does contribute to the understanding of the tree of good and evil
and cannot be absent from any adequate evaluation of technology —as
metascience, in turn, cannot be absent from any evaluation of science—,
and, consequently, of modern culture. Metatechnology offers a quite diffe-
rent picture of technological knowledge and research from the hanging in
the offices of industrialists, managers, politicians, and military men (2).
The intrinsic cultural value of technology is often neglected by those
who esteem it for its practical exploits. This is mistaken, because technolo-
gy, though oriented to practical efficiency and usefulness, cannot be confu-
sed with its misuses and abuses. (In fact, the clarifying and stressing of this
distinction is one of the goals of this work). As to science, it is “useful” to
the extend to which is truthful, not the other way around.
Metatechnology, on the other hand, helps to understand the features
that make technology culturally valuable (3), (as metascience does so with
science), hence educationally indispensable. Gone are the days of classical
studies and scholars (4): ours is the Age of Science and Technology, and
both are a compelling force for improving present knowledge, and present
living conditions.
As for philosophy, at least as it is practiced by most academic philo-
sophers —inasmuch as they are concerned with pseudoproblems or repea-
ting old texts in the search for the total and unchangeable truth—, it has
nothing of real importance to say to our atomic age (Schilp, 1961: 245). If
there was a time when “philosophy not merely did have something to say,
but said it so emphatically that it cost Socrates his life, Spinoza his religious
affiliation, and Kant his right to write and publish” (Schilp, 1961: 239),
present-day philosophy, the “love of wisdom”, has become a (well paid) job
in the so-called First World, and an ideological tool in the Second, while
problems grow bigger and bigger (not only in the so-called Third World)
and the international relations between the two superpowers are even
worse than after World War II. However, while philosophy is dead at the
academic level, it is alive in modern schools of engineering (Bunge, 1977a:
271), and in whatever place in which science is alive. This because we know
(2) As far as technology is an action-oriented knowledge (Tobar, 1984a) its rules unlike
the laws of nature, can be obeyed or broken. Therefore the side effects of technology
can be avoided either by not applying that specific knowledge or by studying the
same problem at deeper levels. Hence, the need of more pure or basic science. There-
fore, the need of more basic research in the R & D budgets. (See Tobar, 1984b,c).)
(3) The impact of modern technology in society has been very significant (think of the
implementation of atomic energy for instance). Greater impacts can be foreseen on
the horizon: fusion plants, undersea mining, economically useful desalinization of
sea water, new synthetic materials, and so forth.
(4) As Kotarbinski (1965: 197) points out, “Until quite recently, there were to be found
perfect example of routinism [which consists according to him in replacing creative
invention by the automatic replication of previous actions] in the form of traditional
curricula, overloaded with the classical languages, whereas the need of life had long
requiredfrom pupils a knowledge of at least two modern languages and a fair orien-
tation in the natural sciences, technology, and the national economy”.
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that there is no demarcation line between science and philosophy, not even
between technology and philosophy (see Bunge (1977b) for a programma-
tic paper to analyze the philosophy of technology). On the other hand, the
great tradition of philosophy is not dead. On the contrary, the aim of philo-
sophy remains what it was in Ancient Greece, namely somehow to describe
how all knowledge fits into a system, into a permanently open system
because knowledge from the different sciences and technologies continues
to increase and changes with time. Since some philosophers have blame
technology for (all) the problems our society has to face, we need to take a
look at the evaluation of technology, and, in particular, at the so-called
‘technology assessment’, TA for short. Moreover, scientific and technologi-
cal research can be guided (or stopped) by good (or bad) philosophy.
2. TECHNOLOGICAL FORECASTING
Technological forecasting is different from scientific prediction (5).
Technological forecasting is a prelude to operational activity (Roman,
1980: 121). Technological objectives should be reviewed and modified for
compatibility with potential accomplishement. After this, a procedure stra-
tegy can be derived to guide planning, programming, implementation, con-
trol, and evaluation. This last stage constitues the so-called ‘technology
assessment’ or TA, which shall be analyzed below.
As Roman (1980: 123) points out, “forecasting is far from an exact
science, so much so that standards methods and procedures have not been
generally established,... network construction are most commonly used.
More exact and understandable techniques must be developed which are
practical and provide management with reasonable confidence in their
accuracy”. In line with this assertion, Bunge (1973 : 212 ff) analyzes the
different varieties of forecasting, from nonscientific (wild guessing, prophe-
sing, common sense forecasting, and expert prognostication) to scientific
(scientific prediction, technological forecasting).
The differences between scientific forecasting or prediction and tech-
nological forecasting are conceptual (the theoretical models employed in
technological forecast are usually simpler and more superficial than those
occurring in scientific prediction), methodological (technological forecast
are supposed to be nomological rather than tentative, whereas scientific
predictions can be either) (6), practical (whereas scientific pradictions are
(5) In both technological forecast and scientific prediction the predicative statement is a
conditional proposition and a logical consequence of hypothes (or theories at best)
and data. While a scientific prediction has the form: If A happens at time t1, then B
will happen at time t2 (t2 > t1) with probability P, the technological forecast has the
form: If the goal B is to be achieved at time t2 with probability P, then A should be
done at time t1 ( t1 < t2) .
(6) Technological forecasting employs only well corroborated hypotheses for its aim is
not to find the truth but to apply it. If tentative the forecast would put the model to
test, not to work.
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value neutral, technological forecasts are value laden and moreover they
can have and effect on those who are cognizant of them.
The accuracy, hence the reliability of the projections involved in any
course of rational action will depend on the state of the disciplines involved
as well as on the nature of the goal. We know many physical, chemical,
and biological laws, and psychological and social trends or quasi-laws. We
have to use those laws and trends if we are dealing with technological fore-
cast, i.e. to forecast the behavior of a man-robot system. (This reminds us
that technological forecast is interdisciplinary). Technological forecasting is
used in design problems everywhere (Tobar, 1984b), and since it is a ratio-
nal action we must take into account its relation with praxiology, if only
because technological planning is based on technological forecast. (See Fig.
1, adapted from Bunge (1973: 208).
As for the specific role of technological forecasting organizations,
there are some advantages to having technological forecasting as an inde-
pendent operation and functional entity if the size of the organization or
firm warrants technological forecasting. Among them the following ones:
a) it can be used by management for checking and balances in assessing the
validity of long-range planning and objectives; b) it can help in determining
what emphasis to place in research and development; c) however, it must
be guarded against excessive cost generated by possible operational practi-
ce inconsistent with the organization’s need and capacity.
Although technological forecasting is a young kid, its present structure
took shape aroud the 1960s (Jantsch, 1967: 17) (7), so far the greatest
application and methodology development has been military oriented (Ro-
man, 1980: 125), as some other branches of technology since the earlier
Latin engineers up to now. In fact, nearly half of the world’s scientists and
technologists were engaged in military works during the 70’s. (More on
Forecasting and Planning can be seen in Roman (1980: Ch. 10, on the use
of the PERT method) and in the journal Technological Forecasting. Social
Change).
3. TECHNOAXIOLOGY
While axiology or value theory is the branch of philosophy concerned
with the nature of values, their origin (biological, social) and their impact
on human action, technoaxiology can be conceived as the study of the
valuations performed by technologists in the course of their profession.
For the scientist all concrete objects are equally worthy of study and
devoid of value: even pollutants, for in pure science valuation bears not on
(7) Technology forecasting differs from technology assessment (Rossini, 1979: 346) in
that technology forecasting focuses on the future of technologies rather than on their
future consecuences. Technology forecast relies on quantitative and qualitative tech-
niques such as trend extrapolation. (See Bright, 1972; Hencley and Yates 1974).
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Fig. l.—Diagram of rational and informed action.
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the objects of study but on research tools (e.g. measurements or computa-
tion techniques) and outcomes (e.g. data and theories). However, this is not
so to the technologists. The technologist evaluates everything: she parti-
tions reality into resources, artifacts, waste products, and useless things.
She values artifacts more than resources (because her task is the design of
artifacts to improve living situations), and resources more than the rest.
This valuations occur as a human activity performed in a concrete socio-
historical context done in the light of definite knowledge and desiderata (8).
The value orientation of technology raises some problems to be eluci-
dated by the technophilosopher or metatechnologist. Here a sample of
them (Bunge 1977b: 165-166):
TAP1. What kind of values (or value functions) does the technologist
handle: economic, social, political, cognitive, aesthetic, or moral —or all of
these?
TAP2. What technological value indicators (or estimators) are the
most reliable: benefit / cost ratios, time saved, satisfaction of social needs,
or what?
TAP3. The values occurring in decision theory and its implications
(e.g. to management and engineering) are subjective. Would it be possible
and desirable to replace them with objective values, such as the degree to
which a basic need has been satisfied? Or with objective-subjective pairs of
values?
TAP4. How could one define the concept of objective value - i.e. what
set of axioms might characterize it unambiguosly (in contrast to the utility
or subjective value)?
TAPS. Would it be possible to formulate decision rules based upon
value theoretic axioms or theorems relating the values of the goals and side
effects to those of the means?
TAP6. The technologist lacking in social sensitivity, just like the poli-
tician without scruples, may ignore the noxious side effects of the means
she employs to attain her goals —or rather those of her employer, and con-
cern solely with achieving technical excellence. Is this one-sideness unavoi-
dable or could it be corrected— e.g. by adopting a global technological
approach, rather than a piecemeal one?
TAP7. Technologist make, or ought to make on the strenght of laws
and value judgments. Would it be possible and desirable to generalize this
procedure to approach moral, legal, and political issues?
TAP8. What is the precise role of value judgments in the drawing up
of urban developments plans, educational projects, health care systems, or
plans for the development of a country?
TAP9. Assuming that every member of a community can assign his
(8) This is so because every deliberated human action is value-oriented. Technology is
an oriented knowledge to achieve some goal or other (Tobar, 1984,a,b). However, the
objects of human action —the things upon which we act— need not always be valua-
ble or disvaluable.
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or her value to every initiative or action in a social scope, is it possible to
form an aggregate value for the community as a whole and thus be able to
speak of the value it assigns to the idea or action?
In general, whereas natural sciences is presumably value-free, techno-
logy and social sciences are arguably value-laden. In what manner and
why?
4. AXIOLOGY OR VALUE THEORY
We have been taught that valuation is beyond the reach of science,
even that it is irrational. But we can argue about value judgments. Actually,
contemporary physiological psychology teaches us that every animal has
an inherited mechanism enabling it to distinguish, not without error, what is
good, bad or indifferent for it.
We must distinguish between the concept of biovalue (Bunge 1979:
89-90) and the concept of phychovalue (Bunge, 1979: 160). The biovalue
of a subsystem a for an organism b at time t is the objective value that a
possesses for b at t. The psychovalue of item a for organism b at time t is
the value b assigns to a at t. This assignment may be biologically mistaken
even though it is a biological event, namely, an animal may attribute great
value to biologically harmful items and little value to biologically valuable
ones. Psychovalues may conflict with biovalues. Let us elucidate the notion
of value system and choice following Bunge (1980: 131-133):
Postulate 1.— All animals are equipped with a value system, and those
capable of learning can modify their value system.
Definition 1.— Let S be a set of items and b an animal. Further, let >b
be a partial order on S. Then the structure Vb = < S, >b > is a value system
for b at a given time t iff.
˜
˜
˜
˜
˜
(i) b can detect any member of S and discriminate it from all other
items in S;
(ii) for any two members x and y of S, b either prefers x to y (x >b y)
or conversely (y >b x) or both (x ˜b y) at the given time.
Definition 2.— Let Vb = <S, >b> be a value system for an animal b at
a given time t, and call AcS a set of alternatives open to b, i.e., belonging to
the behavioral repertoire of b at the time. Then b chooses (or selects) option
xEA iff (i) it is possible for b to pick (i.e. to do) any alternative in A (i.e. b is
free to choose);
(ii) b prefers x to any ather options in A; and
(iii) b actually picks (i.e. does) x.
(Note the difference between preference and choice: the former under-
lies and motivates the latter. See more in Mosterin (1978: 56-57).)
Since higher animals, and in particular humans, live in society, we
characterize culture as one of the main subsystem of society (Tobar,
1984b). The culture of any society is the subsystem of the society whose
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members engage in mental activities that control (or are controlled by)
some of the activities of other members of the society. We distinguish the
creative process (which is a process in some brain or other) from its public
materialization. These mental processes are externalized as physical things
or artifacts which, when perceived by competent observers, elicit in their
brains processes similar to those underwent by the creators. As Bunge
asserts (1980: 172), “Nothing is more dependent and vulnerable —less
autonomous— than the “world” of culture... Culture lives neither, in cultural
artifacts, such as books, nor in an immaterial and autonomous world of
ghosts: it lives in the brains of those who care about it —who cultivate it.”
(About the ontological status of artifacts see my Ontology of Artifacts (To-
bar, 1984b).)
We do not hold the idealistic point of view according to which “Cultu-
re is but a body of ideas and values”. There is no such thing as disembodied
values: there are only concrete people who think up ideas and evaluate. All
the activities that characterize a culture are guided (or misguided) by beliefs
and values belonging to culture.
Values, then, are not autonomous entities, as idealists claim, constitu-
ting a realm of their own opposed or distinct from the world of facts.
Values are properties, not entities. We assign values to things, events, and
ideas. Once values are recognized as an outcome of the valuation activity
of an organism, they become aspects of certain facts. Moreover, in decision
theory values joint with another property of facts, namely their probability.
In fact the very definition of rational decision as that which maximazes the
expected utility (or subjective value) (9) involves such a synthesis of fact
and value. So, the value of an item depends on the item itself and upon the
evaluating organism.
(We shall deal with a value theory transparent to logical analysis and
amenable to empirical control, a value theory of means, goals, and side-
effects elsewhere (Tobar forthcoming). More on value theory in Hartmann
(1969) from a Platonic point of view; in Rescher (1969); and in the journal
Journal of Value Inquiry.)
5. EVALUATION OF TECHNOLOGY
Technology has been seen as the motor of all progress, as a source for
human hapiness, as a promise of utopia (Kahn, 1967). But also as the sour-
(9) Our elucidation of value system is a preference relation. A quantitative concept is
elucidated by utility theory occurring in decision theory as follows (Bunge, 1980:
131): “Utility may be construed as a function U: AxBxT R whose value U (a, b, t)
= u for an object a E A and an organism b E B at time t E T is the value b assigns to a
at t. With the help of this function we can redefine the concept of a value system,
namely thus: The value system of a group of animals B (species, population, commu-
nity, or whatnot) is VB = < A, U >, where A is the set of objects (things, states,
events) valued by the B’s”.
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ce of society’s problems (Ellul, 1967; Mumford, 1967, 1970; Dubos, 1968;
Reich, 1970; Roszak, 1972), as a means for dehumanization. Ours, howe-
ver, will be a critical approach far away from the optimistic and pesimistic
views quoted above.
There was a time —the 60's and 70's—  in which some people blamed
science and technology for the ills of our society. In doing so, they confu-
sed on the one hand science with technology, and, on the other, technology
with its misuse and abuse, even confusing technology with its products.
The antitechnological pivotal (Ellul, Mumford, Dubos, Reich and
Roszak, the last two apostles of “counterculture”) movement can be cha-
racterized as follows (Florman, 1976: Ch. 2):
(i) a primary characteristic of the antitechnologists is the way in
which they refer to “technology” as a thing that has an existence of its own,
an existence separate and distinct from human beings;
(ii) the average citizen is driven by this force, “technology”, to per-
form work he detests;
(iii) he is driven to consume things he does not want;
(iv) they place the blame on a particular group of individuals, namely
the establishement assisted by technology. Technology creates an elite
class of technocrats;
(v) technology has cut man off from the natural world in which he
evolved;
(vi) technology provided man with technical diversions which destroy
the “existential” sense of his own being.
In addition, antitechnologists are against tourism (while, of course,
they practice it), and in politics they advocate for disengangement (when
times demand more and deeper citizen activity).
In contrast, the primitive tribe, the peasant community and medieval
society are considered preferable. But since there is no possibility of going
backward, a reorientation along “human nature” is needed, a return to
man’s “true nature”. The arcadian days (that never were) are missed (10).
(10) Even Skolimowski who considers (1968: 435) that the philosophy of technology is
still in its infancy, and clearly distinguishes science from technology (“While in
science we investigate the reality that is given in technology we create reality accor-
ding to our designs” (1968: 434)), noting the dispute on technology and values (“The
major adversaries in the disputes on technology and values are the optimists on the
one hand, the pesimists on the other. The optimists, whose views are usually expres-
sed in pamphlets published by big industrial corporations, see in technology a condi-
tion sine qua non for, and often the embodiment of, human happiness. The pesimists,
who are usually found in the academic world, envisage technology as devouring
human values and consequently as dehumanizing our lives” (1968: 429), and takes
“Philosophy of technology (as) the philosophy for our times” (Skolimowski, 1976:
459), however, later on (Skolimowski, 1979: 331) he claims that “‘Philosophers,
futurologists, and all other people who are concerned with the future of technology
and thus the future of our culture should be sent to Indian reservations [to alternati-
ve life styles]: they should be sent to oriental societies and cultures in which alternati-
ve ways of interpreting the world are still viable and form alternative basis of know-
ledge and of life styles”. Enthusiastic as we are with the Indian affair (see Matthiesen,
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However, it is true that “there are aspects of earlier cultures that seem
appealing, and to which we can usefully look in structuring our own lives.
But the antitechnologists have distorted the picture shamelessly, glorifying
the earlier cultures and at the same time defaming ours. Then, with the air
of protecting the higher values and the nobler pursuits, they blame the fan-
cied deterioration in society on the role supposedly played by technology”
(Florman, 1976: 73).
Although there are formidable problems which must. be met head-on
(11) and solved, new knowledge in form of deeper science and right appli-
1983), we cannot agree with Skolimowski. On the contrary, we submit that we need
more and deeper science, more and better technology than ever if we want to solve
the problems that present-day society faces (Tobar, 1984b,c). Nevertheles, we do
agree with him when he asserts (Skolimowski, 1979: 329) that “the philosophy of
technology must not be conceived as a mere scholastic discipline. Of course, a scho-
lastic approach does give comfort and aesthetic pleasure to those engaged in it, and
these satisfactions are important. However, let us be aware above all that the phi-
losphy of technology emerged as a result of a critical appraisal of the state of our
civilization. It did not evolve to provide analytically minded philosophers with an
arena in which to perform their marvelously effective analytical pirouettes”. On the
contrary, the philosophy of technology has emerged “because of the urgency and
magnitude of social and human problems arising from the interaction of society with
technology” (Skolimowski, 1979: 334). In creating the philosophy of technology “we
might be able to awaken philosophers and students of philosophy from their analyti-
cal slumber and show them once more what an exciting subject philosophy is... The
philosophy of technology is not the panacea which will cure all ills, but it might beco-
me a most illuminating, exciting, and significant intellectual endeavor for our times” (
(Skolimowski, 1979: 335).
Florman (1976: 98) is asking the same: “Somehow the engineer will find a philosop-
hical platform from which he can once again view the world with zest. He need not
choose between the roles of discredited messiah and plodding technician.
“The time has come for us to end with defending ourselves against spurious criticism
and to start in search of an engineering philosophy for our age”. The wrong choice is
existentialism, pace Florman himself.
And Feibleman (1982: 6) reminds us that the great tradition of philosophy is not
dead. On the contrary, the aim ofphilosophy remains that it was in ancient Greece,
namely, somehow to describe how all knowledge fits into a system, though now it
would have to be an permanently open system because knowledge borrowedfrom the
sciences continues to increase for ever, So, as far as the epistemologist —the meta-
technologist or technophilosopher in this case of the study of technology— has to take
sides, we do take sides with critical and scientific realism and emergent and scienti-
fic materialism as the ground for the Philosophy of Technology for our times (see
Tobar, 1984b).
(11) Here are some of specific future prospects that need more and deeper science, and
more and better technology:
(i)  improved education. New fields and career patterns create interdisciplinarity;
(ii) less human physical work and more leisure time:
(iii) internationalism. Increased travels and mobility. Technology transfer. Tech-
nological consortiums and multi-national organizations;
(iv) improved communications;
(v)  longer life expectancy;
(vi)   recognition of individuals rights, and social rights, democratic participation;
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cation of it —via technology— taking into account side effects and social
consequences may, and eventually can, help us in handling them. As a
rebuttal of antitechnologists, compared to conditions of a hundred years
ago, human life is much dearer today. The environmental crisis is clearer
than ever (DeVore 1980: 304-308) and ecological studies spread everywhe-
re. As DeVore (1980: 338-339) points out, the study of technology requires
the study of the interrelation of various systems: technical, social, ideologi-
cal, and ecological (see Fig. 2):
Fig. 2.— Interrelation of systems.
Technical components consist of resources, materials, tools, machi-
nes, energy, power, and information. Social components consist of human
elements including work skills, intellectual processes, occupations, environ-
mental relationships, and organization and management of technical sys-
tems. Social components include social systems, ideological systems, and
ecological systems. See, in Fig. 3, the evolution and relationship of techno-
logical systems and social purpose:
(vii)  rational economic use of ocean resources. Minerals, food, water;
(viii)  change in women’s role in society:
(ix) improved health care. Better medicines, new drugs, artificial organs;
(x) Improved waste disposal, recycling;
(xi) constant evaluation of technological priorities:
(xii)  universal prosperity and peace;
(xiii)  stop of arms race.
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Fig. 3.— Evolution and relationship of technological systems and social purpose. Adapted
from DeVore (1980: 340).
The destruction of the natural environment must be halted. The dama-
ge may not be irreversible and irreparable. So, we need a realistic assess-
ment of technological processes, via technology assessment, TA for short,
so that we can use appropriate technologies— soft, intermediate, or hard
technologies because Small is beautiful and also Large is beautiful depen-
ding on the importance and magnitude of the problems to be solved. (More
on that in a while).
There is a dangerous descent from antitechnologism and antiscienti-
cism to antiintellectualism and irrationalism. Blaming technology is, most
of the times, an irrational scapegoat (Florman, 1981; Tobar, 1984c). Only
reason and intelligence can solve our problems: if we turn against them, we
are totally lost. As Rescher (1980: 20) observes, “Science and technology
will not, cannot, produce the millenium. And yet in a crowed world of very
limited resources we cannot create an adequate setting for human life wit-
hout them... The poor workman always blames his tools; but the difficulties
lie not in the tools but in our capacity to make intelligent use of them”. The
cruel fact is that instead of stressing the importance of basic science, there-
fore basic investigation in R & D budgets, a society that spends many
billions of dollars on a various cornucopia of deleterious trivia, to say no-
thing of untold on military outlays, assumes an unconfortable moral postu-
re in deciding that science —even big and expensive science— is a game that
is not worth the candle (Rescher, 1980: 103-104). A cutting of pure investi-
gation budgets, will not only be a sin against our seek for truth but also a
substantial stagnation in the pace of progress.
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6. TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (TA)
In seeking to clarify the issues involved here, our aim is to do the job
of a metatechnologist or technophilosopher: to raise questions, to sharpen
our focus on the issues, and to indicate the considerations that must be
taken into account. This does not necessarily imply to provide answers and
solutions. It seems to be a preliminary.
Technology has had a strong exogenus effect on environment. Until
very recently, technology assessment, TA for short, was based on narrow
considerations of technical efficacy and immediate, direct and observable
results. TA is a child of the  (see Settle (1976)). However, increasing
knowledge of the indirect impacts of technology upon society and the envi-
ronment has led to systematic study of the effects of technology. As Rossi-
ni (1979: 342) observes, “TA is systematic, higher order, interdisciplinary,
action oriented, and future oriented”. The main task of TA is to forecast
the range of possible effects of technology so as to clarify society’s choices
before options. TA systematically examines the possible effects on society
and on its ecological environment when a technology is introduced, exten-
ded, or modified. Therefore, the interest of the study of the so-called “ap-
propriate technology”. While technologists are divided over the hardness of
technology —advanced, appropriate, or soft—, a deep study of the possible
effects of technology implementation can lead to the appropriate choice.
Nowadays the whole bulk of TA reports are related to all the different
branches of technology. Hetman (1973) points out that in the United States
the main areas in which technology studies have been undertaken are food,
housing, biomedicine, energy, transportation, and nuclear energy. The
objective of TA is the systematic examination of a specific technology as a
component, subsystem, or system of a concrete social system, and the eva-
luation of implications which include but extend beyond technological
accomplishemeny. As Kiefer (1970) says, “Technology assessment is an
attempt —still halting and uncertain—to establish an earlywarning system
to control direct, and, if necessary, restrain technological development so
as to maximize the public good while mini/mizing the public risk. It is, no
less, a new approach to allocating scientific resources, setting technological
priorities, and seeking more beningn alternatives to the technology already
at hand”.
In this sense, it can be said with Skolimowski (1976: 460) that TA is a
social critique of technology at large. In fact, technologies can be assessed
from different points of view:
(i) from a technological point of view: Is this technology functional?
Is it supported by scientific knowledge? What are the alternative technolo-
gies? Which are the related technologies?;
(ii) from an economic point of view: Does this technology affect the
economic structure? What economic system does this technology develop:
public or private?;
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(iii) from a sociological point of view: Does technology create a need
for new professional categories and make some other categories obsolete?
What is the relation between the implementation of technology and unem-
ployement? How does technology affect the composition of the population
and the availability of human and material resources? How does technolo-
gy affect community, family, property? What are its legal constraints;
(iv) from the individual point of view: Does this technology affect
health and life expectancy? How does the technology affect experience and
social status? Does it make any difference to the quality of life or in the
education of the individuals? Does the technology affect participation and
social commitment?
(v) from an environmental point of view : Does technology affect envi-
ronmental quality or the ecological balance? Does the technology affect
environmental resources and man-made environments such as urban
areas?;
(vi) from the point of view of the values and social responsibility of
the decison maker: Does technology affect other goals or the national inte-
rest? What vested interest may appear in the course of the implementation
of such technology? What interest may press for the adoption of the tech-
nology? Is the government involved?
(See more on that in Hetman (1913).)
TA is usually performed by a team containing representatives of diffe-
rent disciplines. The tasks of TA are typically the folloving ones (Rossini,
1919: 344-345):
1. Defining and bounding the assessment focus (including the com-
prehensiveness and depth of coverage).
2. Describing the technology to be assessed (including a discussion of
technological alternatives).
3. Forecasting the development of the technology (technology fore-
casting).
4. Describing the most important features of the context (social, eco-
nomic, environmental) with which the technology interacts most closely.
5. Forecasting the development of the technology’s context.
6. Identifying direct and, were possible, higher order consequences or
impacts of the interaction between the technology and its context.
7. Analyzing these conquences (economic, environmental, social, ins-
titutional, etc.) by various quantitative and qualitative techniques.
8. Evaluating the impacts and integrating the findings.
9. Identifying and analyzing the policy issues and options involved
and possible making recommendations.
10. Communicating the results of the assessment (12).
(See an alternative list in Hetman (1913: Ch. 3).
(12) In turn, Jones (quoted in Roman, 1980: 120) suggest seven major steps in making
TA:
(i) Define the assessment task
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Present-day TA is more of an academic concern than a practical and
effective tool for decision making. It is important to develop a body of
knowledge on TA including methodology, procedure and applications.
Because TA may be too costly, controversial, vague, and academic, it is
also important to develop realistic indicators for the different impacts of
technology and their evaluation. In this sense, Carpenter (1911: 588 ff)
sees some unresolved philosophical issues in TA along the following lines:
Epistemology of TA.—Clarification of impacts and social indicators.
Interdisciplinary communication. Need of a philosopher on TA.
Axiology of TA.—Clarification of the implicit norms which are
brought to the team of TA practitioners.
Ontology of TA.—Clarification of the notion of society.
7. APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY
We have seen above that technology implementation must be planned.
To plan technology, there must be some level of expectations from techno-
logy. This is where technological forecasting comes into the scene. Techno-
logical feasibility, by itself, is not sufficient. We must also know if a techno-
logical innovation is economically justifiable and socially and politically
acceptable. When we consider the social consequences, it becomes techno-
logy assessment. TA goes beyond self-interest evaluation of such factors as
technological feasibility and profitability. Furthermore, it has been pointed
out that TA would involve several disciplines and would seek a cross-
impact analysis of the technology under investigation.
We have refused to takes sides in the debate about pessimism versus
optimism in evaluating technology, although something has already been
said (see a rebuttal of antitechnology in Florman (1916: Ch. 3) (13). Ins-
(ii)  Describe relevant technologies.
(iii) Develop state-of-society-assumptions.
(iv)  Identify impact areas.
(v)  Make preliminar impact analysis.
(vi)) Identify possible action options.
(vii) Complete impact analysis.
And Coates (quoted in Roman (1980: 129) identifies ten modules of a TA:
(a)  Definition of the problem, the technology, issue or project to be assessed.
(b)  Definition of alternative systems to be examined.
(c)  The unfolding of impacts.
(d)  Evaluation of the significance of impacts.
(e)  The decision apparatus.
(f)  Defining options and alternatives,
(g)  Parties at interest with regard to a particular technology.
(h) To recognize and analyze the impacts of variation on the technology under con-
sideration.
(i) Exogenous factors should have a prominant place in any TA.
(j) One must examine all the above to come to some set of conclusions.
(13) To make thing worse, many defensors of technology are indeed philistines of first
order with a fatuous overoptimism on technology.
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tead of vendettas we should face the problems. Distateful as it may be to
some people, it is clear to us that our survival, and the salvaging of our
environment, are dependent upon more and better technology, not less (To-
bar, 1984c). We do not agree with the apocalyptic view of the antitechnolo-
gists. Nor with the apologetic view of prophets like Kahn. Ours is one in-
between view, more critical than those two views. When blaming someone,
we can and must blame the technologist’s bosses, namely the politicians
and entrepreneurs. Florman (1976: 34) clearly points them out: “Govern-
ment traditionally has shown little interest in long-range planing (except for
the military) and little concern for the preservation of natural resources”. It
is irrational to blame technologists for things that were done at the behest
of society. Technologists do not have the power to make major decisions
for society (14). “The big question of what to do next are not technical, or
only partly technical. They are primarily political... The world is run by
politicians and entrepreneurs” (Florman, 1976: 38). (See more on that in
Agassi (1983).) We all do agree that the public interest is very important,
public welfare would lead our actions. But how do we determine what the
right is? While the thought of technologists designing nuclear weapons is
horrifying some of us, many technologists (and scientists) consider such
activity necessary and proper for the sake “of freedom and defense of
Western-civilization” in the West, or for the sake “of defense of socialism
and against possible aggression of imperialism” in the East, whatever both
may be. Even within technologists we do have debates on pollution control
(15), on energy conservation (16), on some technological actions and their
side effects (17). These are some of the difficulties in assessing the impact
of technology (18), and in the search for a technological ethics (19).
(14) See in Florman (1981: Ch. 3) the “power” of engineering in social and political
affairs. If blaming somebody, we must look at politicians and entrepreneurs. Techno-
logists have no power whatsoever in decisions that can affect society.
(15) See Florman (1976: 27 ff). An increase of interest and activity by technologists in the
public arena should be good for society. The technological approach cannot solve all
social problems. However, it can make an extremely valuable contribution to the
public discourse and debate.
(16) See Florman (1976: 33-35) and DeVore (1980: 282 ff). DeVore also deals with
energy choices: solar energy, nuclear energy, and alternative energy sources (pp. 293
ff).
(17) Would the supersonic transport affect the upper atmosphere, allowing an excess of
hamfull ultraviolet rays to reach the earth? Will the large-scale use of nitrogen fer-
tilizers or ordinary aerosol cans do the same effects? Has the total banning DDT
been precipitate, and done more harm than good? What about the problems raised
by genetic engineering? How do we avoid the fussion troubles (see Lidsky 1983)?
Incredibly, more than three decades into the atomic age, and the necesary research
and development on nuclear waste have not been performed. Even the problem of
how to finances TA organizations and their control or not by Governments is debatable.
(18) Although careful and multidisciplined studied, using techniques of modeling and sys-
tems analysis, must be supported, even these reports must stand the test of public and
political debate. As pointed out in Tobar (1984d) ends, social, political and cultural
ends, and the means to attain them have to be chosen through democratic participa-
tion.
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However, we must try to define our basic needs —for we submit that
basic needs have not changed substantially through history— and some
approach to public services and public welfare (see Rescher, 1972). We are
in need of love, food, clothing, work, play and fun among other things. To
satisfy these needs, technologists —and engineers in particular— play an
increasingly important rule. If there were golden years for engineering (bet-
ween 1850 and 1950), after 1950 engineering “entered into a dark age of
criticism and self-doubt” (Florman, 1976: Ch. 2), while, in turn, “engin-
neers again and again found themselves subservient to finances and busi-
nessmen” (Florman, 1976: 9).
There can be no denying that with the nuclear arms race, the coming
of the environmental crisis and whatnot, our relationship to society has
changed. We cannot —should not— pretend that it has not happened. We
must face all those problems. Man, via technology and the creationof arti-
facts, has raised problems which in turn react against man himself chan-
ging his behavior and some of his needs. Some of us, nevertheless, (Agassi,
1983; Bunge, 1977b; Florman, 1976, 1981; Tobar, 1984c), maintain that
we need more and deeper science, more and better technology to try and
solve those problems. Here the “cultural” challenge of our times.
If the term ‘technology’ is a concept that is constantly being defined
and redifined (Tobar, 1984b: Ch. 1), nowadays the debate among techno-
logists is on the appropriateness of technology.
The term ‘appropriate technology’ has evolved from intermediate.
technology, which in turn is found in Schumacher’s Small is beautiful. Alt-
hough the terms ‘intermediate’ and ‘appropriate technology’ are frequently
used as synonymous, in fact there are substantial differences. A technology
can be poor (soft) or advanced (hard). Intermediate technology represents
some middle ground between these extremes. (It is worth noting that an
intermediate technology may not be an appropriate one. On the other
hand, not all small is beautiful (20). As Roman (1980: 138) observes, “In
evaluating an environment to attempt to determine the appropriateness of a
(19) See a first approach to technoethics in Bunge (1977c) Gravender (1981), Hodges
(1981), and Rogers (1981). Although this subject will be treated elsewhere (Tobar,
forthcoming;), it is worth noting that practically every description of the practice ‘of
engineering has stressed the concept of service to humanity as Florman (1976: 19)
shows: “Thomas Tredgold’s classic definition dates from 1929: ‘Engineering is the
art of directing the great sources of power in nature for the use and convenience of
man”. The definitions have been pouring forth ever since, most of them saying the
same thing with just a few words changed here and there: “...for the benefit of the
human race” (Henry G. Scott, 1907); “...for the general benefit of mankind” (S. E.
Lindsay, 1920); “...for the good of humanity” (R. E. Hellmund, 1929); “...applying
...to the needs of mankind “(Vannevar Bush, 1939)”. However, most of the times the-
se beautiful words have just been words.
(20) Some of the “small” technologies introduced into nations such as India have also
been fiascos: wind-powered water pumps installed in areas where are long seasons of
windlessness, bio-gas generators that fail to work in the cool of winter and so on.
(See more in Florman (1981: Ch. 8).)
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technology, a broad range of factors must be considered. A technology
that might be appropriate at a given time or place might not be appropriate
at a different time or at a different place”.
A concern for appropriate technology would seem to call for both lar-
ge and small solutions in an ever-changing flux (21), taking into account
the appropriateness (i) to goal (Does the technology support the goals of
development policy?), (ii) of product (Is the final product or service delive-
red useful, acceptable and affordable to the intended users); (iii) of process
(iv), of culture and environment (Are the product-process, the product deli-
vered, and the institutions arrangements compatible with local environment
and cultural setting?). In reaching possible agreement as to what constitu-
tes an appropriate technology, consideration must be given to such ele-
ments as social and environmental goals, evaluation of technological
impact, compatibility of the technology with needs; in relation to social and
economic conditions, the availability of capital, the type, quantity and qua-
lity of indigenous labor —minimizing unpleasant aspects of work—, the cost
of the technology and its subsequent dispersion, the scale or size of the
technology and the existence and accessibility of natural resources —opti-
mizing the use of indigenous resources and protecting environment (People
participation in decission process which affect their daily lives is, of course,
very important when determining the appropriateness of technology. See
Alexander (1975, 1979).) When developing appropriate technology, then,
environmental conditions are critical. It would provide a fair economic
environment by supplying food, services, and jobs (22). Another environ-
mental condition is overpopulation (or inequitable distribution of popula-
tion with problems of hunger, malnutrition, misuse of available land, and
unemployment (23). The cultural environment is crucial to technological
development (illiteracy, wrong educated systems can retard such imple-
(21) Or as Roman (1980: 138) points out, “appropriate technology incorporates soft or
social technology, as well as hard or engineering technology. Appropriate technolo-
gy, to be effective, must accomodate custom and tradition. There must also be recog-
nition that in a given society the level of appropriate technology may, in the short
run, be lower than technology in other societies due to differing environmental requi-
rements”.
(22) Contrary to what could be expected, many developed countries (Roman, 1980: 139),
“‘the United States in particular, have false economies of excess waste and consum-
tion. The economic system has been unable to promote prosperity and jobs “for peo-
ple without exaggerated and often, unnecessary obsolescence or war-type produc-
tion”. The whole of economic theories do not work: “Unfortunately, there does not
appear to be much long-range planning directed to developing appropriate technolo-
gies for technologically advanced nations (Roman, 1980: 139)“.
(23) “Each nation must evaluate environmental conditions relative to its existence. Each
nation must determine what technologies are necessary, have promise, and are
appropriate. The technology, the developmental level of that technology, and the
degree of appropiateness will vary from environment to environment. National and
local planning is essential as a prelude to the promotion of appropriate technology”
(Roman, 1980: 140).
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mentation of technology (24). (See Roman (1980: 142-143) for designing
the system to achieve appropriate technology objectives, and (1980: 143-
145) for decisional factors in promoting appropriate technology taken into
account national and world problems.)
When technologists are confronted with a problem of design, in which
the goal is to satisfy certain needs, often the solution most effective, econo-
mical, elegant, satisfactory, suitable, fit, proper, “appropriate” is a techno-
logy that is large in scale (think of the problems raised by the consume of
water for instance). So, in our view the debate large / small, hard / soft,
high / low is a false one (parallel to the debate on pessimism / optimism
when evaluating technology in general). We need Small is beautiful and
Large is beautiful (most times even both at the same time) according to the
magnitude and kind of problems to be solved, according to the social, poli-
tical, and cultural constraints. (This clarification is critical when dealing
with developing countries and the so-called “technology transfer”. More on
this in a while.) Consequently the notion of welfare, public welfare (Res-
cher, 1972) must also be clarified, and technology assessment must be
taken into account.
8. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
A nation undertaking technological development should consider
various possibilities, or levels, of national technological capability. Techno-
logical capability can vary from total self-sufficiency in a given technology
to complete dependence in other technologies. It is highly improbable that a
nation can be totally self-sufficient or totally dependent in all technologies.
Sufficience or dependence levels will vary according to resources, priorities,
and the state of national development.
Before any operation in technology transfer, existing and potential
capability must be determined. For this task there are same factors (Ro-
man, 1980: 108) that can be used to serve as general guidelines for evalua-
ting technological capability:
1. The number of researchers.
a) The quality of education.
b) The number of advanced degrees.
c) The currency and applicability of education.
d) Expertise.
2. The number of support technicians.
(24) However, since (Roman, 1980: 141) “The ruling cadre or economic elitists invaria-
bly have a strong core of people who have been university educated in Western coun-
tries... the results is often a bias... toward Western technology. Western technology,
as practiced in Western countries, may not be appropiate to developing countries”.
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a) The ratio of technicians to scientists / engineers.
b) The quality of technicians training.
3. Facilities.
a) The quantity and quality of existing facilities including test equip-
ment.
b) Provisions for facility maintenance and modernization.
4. Educational support.
a) Interface with national universities.
b) Relevance and capability of universities programs to technology.
c) Availability of educational resources to qualified students.
5. Budget.
a) The amount of existing obligations and the level of financial com-
mitment a nation is willing to make to sponsor technological development.
6. Research results.
a) Actual recognized scientific accomplishment.
b) Research applied to practical technological problems.
c) Internationally recognized scientific leaders.
d) Publications.
7. Growth of technology.
a) Technologists as a percentage of the work force.
b) The percent of research and development expenditures to gross
national product.
c) Technological utilization.
Basic science has to be developed also in developing countries (Salam,
1984). For arguments supporting consensus in ends or goals, and the
democratic participation of these ends see Agassi (1983), and Tobar
(1984d) where I submit that also the means have to be democratically deci-
ded.
Employing technology forecasting and technology assessment prove
useful in the decision process of whether to embark or not on technological
development. See in Fig. 4 a systems approach to Science and Technology
policy, S & T policy, determination (addapted from Roman (1980: 110).
(For forecasting and planning at microlevel see Roman (1980: Ch. 10).)
Decision making is chiefly concerned to politicians or managers.
Scientists and technologists are not involved in making business or political
decisions, but make numerous technological decisions based on facts.
As has been seen in the previos section, a technology can be inappro-
priate if it is either too advanced or not sufficiently advanced for the speci-
fic social, political, economic, and cultural environment. Many forces are
compelling in pulling inappropriate technology to developing countries
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(think of the power of the multinational firms). So, imported technologies
may be inappropriate, and this for different reasons (Roman, 1980: 146).
Moreover, there are also ideological factors: many critics in less developed
countries view appropriate technology as “technological imperialism”.
Because of that the appropriateness of a technology in a society must be
sensitive to political receptivity, among other factors. However, what is
good and relevant in one society may not be relevant in another. That is
why appropriate technology must be clarified before technology transfer
processes can be rightly employed. (For details in technology transfer see
Roman (1980: Ch. 9), Gruber and Marquis (1969), Research in Phil. and
Tech. (1983, Vol. 6), Seurat (1979))
In technology transfer nonprofit organizations (UNESCO, OECD)
have an increasing role to play. See in Fig. 5 (adapted from Roman (1980:
211) some of the benefits of technology transfer and the process to facilita-
te it:
National Needs                             Objectives
Range of Technological Priorities
Resource Evaluation
Human
Natural
Economic
Constrains
Social
Political
Cultural
Economic
Technological
Internal / External
Environmental
Factors
Prospects
Contribution to needs Technology forecasting
Contribution to growth and
Potential for success Assessment
Technological Short and
Economic Long run
Political Considerations
Determination of Science and Technology Policy.
Programs
Objetives   Plans
Implementation
Feedback
Fig. 4.— Science and Technology policy.
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Social-Political-Cultural-Economic
Technology Utilization and Transfer
Products - Processes
Government Government
Consumer Consumer
Process     for    Transfer.                                                      
Education, people exchange pro-
grams, scientific journals, scientific confe-
rences, seminars, multi-national firms,
international agencies, joint economic
ventures, patents and licensing arrange-
ments.
Benefits of technology transfer.
1. Improve production, capability,
improved skills and techniques, overall
improvement in the level of science and
technology.
2.  Economic benef i ts  such as
increased employment opportunities,
increased income, purchasing power,
reduction in product prices, more easily
obtainable products.
3. Social and cultural effects impro-
ved living standars, change in thinking
and changing attitudes toward life.
                   Obstacles to Technology.
Reluctance to share. Technology no
promise for adequate return if technology
shared, fear of ultimate competition,
exporting of unemployment, cost or price
for use of technology, nationalism, lan-
guage, trade restrictions or barries.
Procedures to facilitate technology
transfer.
Meeting of qualified people in rele-
vant technology, international sponsor-
ship of technology.
Meeting between nations on subjects
which have higth national priorities,
Encourage publication and international
recognition.
Short and frequent meeting of peo-
ple in related disciplines to foster commu-
nication and encourage continuing com-
munication.
Fig. 5.— Technology Transfer Model.
Technology transfer, can, as in the case of Japan, afford the opportu-
nity for technological acceleration and the subsequent attainment of tech-
nological parity.
As Roman (1980: 212) observes, “The transfer of appropriate techno-
logy can lead to political and sociological benefits. The technology should
be utilized for community needs and interest. It should use human and
natural resources for sociologically benefit purposes. If there are improved
economic standards leading to a better life with relative freedom from sick-
ness, hunger, and material needs along with an expanded life expectancy
the economic attainments are consistent with sociological benefits. To
accomplish economic objectives and social well-being there must be the
right political climate”. This climate implies political freedom. Otherwise, it
would be impossible the discussion on the appropriateness of technology.
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Any honest technology transfer deal stipulates that the customer will
get not only artifacts and the corresponding operating and service manuals
but also experts capable of teaching by example how to handle and service
the system. This not only because not everything can be put into manuals,
but also because know-how cannot be wholly transmited except by exam-
ple. Although for some purposes we feign that cognitive processes have a
“content” that can be communicated to other brains or externalized as arti-
facts such as computers or plannings, actually there is no such content and,
no such transfer. Acquiring knowledge is learning something, namely going
through a certain brain process, hence not the same as acquiring a machine
or some other instruction book. The manipulation of artifacts, reading, or
drawing involve sensory-motor activities. But all those artifacts, when used,
are used as adjuncts to the nervous system of somebody: they enjoy no
autonomy in their use, neither in their creation (see Tobar (1984b). Even
the most automatic of computation is but a link in a cognitive process ocu-
rring in some brain. There is no robot work but only robot-aided work, and
there is no automatic cognition but only computer-aided cognition.
Knowledge is encoded in cultural artifacts that circulate through the
community. This facilitate the storing, sharing, and enriching knowledge.
However, there in no independent “content” of knowledge, independent
from the inquiring subject. Yet from a methodological point of view it is
convenient to feing that cognitive process do have a transferable content,
so that we may think of the latter separately from the former. This, of cour-
se, is a fiction, not an ontological thesis on ideas. (More on the ontological
status of formal artifacts in Tobar (1984b).)
When dealing with explicit versus tacit knowledge a problem of inte-
rest is whether there are neurophysiological conditions that impose the
disotiation between knowing how and kowing that or whether, with some
effort we could render explict every bit of tacit knowledge. This problem is
of interest to educationist and experts in technology transfer. Both groups
would like to know whether every bit of knowledge can eventually be pou-
red into a manual or tape.
While in science there is no problem of “science transfer” because in
basic science we are interested in the search for truth for its own sake and
dealing with models of reality, technology has to touch the real, noisy, and
“imperfect” world. So, our technological models must be evaluated in spe-
cific socio-politico-economico-cultural environments. Once they are pro-
per, they can be transferred to similar conditions and environments.
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